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Abstract
Machine learning systems based on deep neural networks, be-
ing able to produce state-of-the-art results on various percep-
tion tasks, have gained mainstream adoption in many applica-
tions. However, they are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial
example attack, which generates malicious output by adding
slight perturbations to the input. Previous adversarial exam-
ple crafting methods, however, use simple metrics to evaluate
the distances between the original examples and the adver-
sarial ones, which could be easily detected by human eyes.
In addition, these attacks are often not robust due to the in-
evitable noises and deviation in the physical world. In this
work, we present a new adversarial example attack crafting
method, which takes the human perceptual system into con-
sideration and maximizes the noise tolerance of the crafted
adversarial example. Experimental results demonstrate the ef-
ficacy of the proposed technique.
Introduction
With the increasing popularity of deep learning technology,
its security problems have attracted a significant amount of
attention from both academia and industry. Among all se-
curity problems, the most severe one is adversarial example
attack first proposed in (Szegedy et al. 2013). It attempts to
modify the legal input with slight perturbations that largely
changes the output given by neural networks. This kind of
attack is really a threat for security-sensitive systems, such
as self-driving systems, disease diagnose systems and mali-
cious email filters (Bojarski et al. 2016; Amato et al. 2013;
Clark, Koprinska, and Poon 2003). For example, in self-
driving systems, an adversarial example attack can change
a stop-road sign to a turn-left signal. Then the car will make
a wrong decision and cause a serious traffic accident.
Several adversarial example attacks against neural net-
works are proposed in the literature (Szegedy et al. 2013; Pa-
pernot et al. 2016; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014).
They target to misclassify the output to a specific class by
adding minimum perturbations. Although they demonstrate
effective attacks against neural networks, several problems
remained to be solved. Firstly, adversarial examples gener-
ated by them are not sufficiently imperceptible. They all use
distance metrics of Lp norms (L0, L2 and L∞ norms) to
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evaluate the similarity between the original samples and the
crafted adversarial ones. These metrics are objective, which
treat perturbations of different pixels in an image equally im-
portant for human eyes. However, according to (Legge and
Foley 1980), people are more sensitive to perturbations of
pixels in low variance regions. For example, perturbations
in the uniform background are easier to be detected than
those in image regions with mussy objects. Without consid-
ering the human perceptual system, highly sensitive pixels
may be changed too much, which increases the probabil-
ity to be detected. Secondly, previous attacks are not robust
enough. The success attack rate drops largely in the physical
world due to the noises and deviation inevitably generated.
For instance, the adversarial examples may be compressed
or suffer from noises during transmission. Thus, the adver-
sarial example which attacks successfully in the experimen-
tal condition may fail in the complex physical world. Re-
cently, some research efforts have been dedicated to robust
attacks for certain situations, such as face recognition (Sharif
et al. 2016) and road sign recognition (Evtimov et al. 2017).
However, they are rather application-specific and cannot be
generalized for other applications.
To solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose
a new method to craft imperceptible and robust adversarial
examples against neural networks. We first introduce a new
distance metric considering sensitivity of the human percep-
tual system to different pixels. This metric guides us with
how many perturbations can be added without being de-
tected. Then we optimize to maximize the noise tolerance
of adversarial examples to improve the success attack rate
in the physical world. Specifically, we target to increase the
gap between the target class probability and the max prob-
ability of other classes, which is generally applicable for a
large amount of applications based on neural networks. By
introducing a new quantity to evaluate the effects of pertur-
bations added to each pixel, we present a greedy algorithm
to find which pixels to perturb and what magnitude to add ef-
fectively and efficiently. Our optimization method can gen-
erate adversarial examples with both high imperceptibility
and high robustness, as demonstrated in the experimental re-
sults.
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Szegedy et al. first proposed adversarial example attack
against neural networks. It minimizes the distances evalu-
ated with L2-norm between the original examples and the
adversarial ones under the constraint that the adversarial at-
tack is successful. FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014) performs the attack by first calculating the gradients
of the loss function to search which directions to change for
each pixels. Then it modifies all pixels simultaneously under
the L∞ constraint. Recently, JSMA (Papernot et al. 2016)
builds a saliency map to model the impact each pixel has on
the resulting classification. It then optimizes with the L0 dis-
tance, where it picks the most important pixel based on the
saliency map and modify the pixel to increase the target class
probability in each iteration. However, these attack methods
all use simple distance metrics (Lp-norms) to evaluate the
similarity between the adversarial example and the original
one without considering the human perceptual system.
There are some research efforts about robust adversarial
example attacks in the literature. The authors in (Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) first discussed the idea when
they found some adversarial examples survived in the phys-
ical world. However, they did not present a solution to im-
prove the success attack rate. Recently, two papers studied
adversarial examples for certain applications in the physi-
cal world. (Sharif et al. 2016) proposed a physical realizable
adversarial example attack against the face recognition sys-
tem through wearing malicious eye-glasses. (Evtimov et al.
2017) discussed a practical attack on the road sign recogni-
tion in self-driving systems. They generate adversarial road
signs which can successfully deceive the recognizer in vari-
ous directions and angles. However, these two methods are
rather application-specific and are not generally applicable.
Apart from adversarial example attacks against neural
networks in computer vision systems, many other machine
learning applications are suffering from adversarial example
attacks. (Carlini et al. 2016) proposed an attack against the
speech recognition system, where they show how to craft
sounds that are difficult for human to understand, but can
be interpreted to specific commands such as “Call 911” and
“Turn on airplane mode”. In (Grosse et al. 2016), they intro-
duce adversarial example attacks against malware detecting
systems. In these attacks, they disguise a malware into a be-
nign one and successfully fool the detector.
Adversarial Example Attacks
Adversarial example attacks target to change the output of
machine learning systems by adding slight perturbations to
the input. In the literature, there are two categories of ad-
versarial example attacks: target attack and un-target attack.
For the target attack, it attempts to misclassify a sample to
a specific class, while un-target attack only tries to misclas-
sify the input. As a result, the target attack is more difficult
than the un-target one. In this paper, we focus on the target
adversarial example attack.
Generally speaking, adversarial example attacks should
not only fool machine learning systems but also consider
two important factors: imperceptibility and robustness.
Imperceptibility: The imperceptibility of an adversarial
example means that it should look similar to the original one
in order not to be detected by human eyes. So in the attack, it
is important to use an appropriate distance metric to evaluate
the similarity between an adversarial example and the orig-
inal one. A good distance metric should clearly reflect the
characteristic of the human perceptual system. Otherwise,
the imperceptibility of adversarial examples would not be
ensured.
Robustness: Adversarial examples are firstly crafted by
the attackers and then transmitted to the machine learning
systems. They may fail to attack after the transmissions with
inevitable noises or deviation. The robustness of adversarial
examples reflects its ability to stay misclassified to the target
class after suffering transformations in the physical world.
The definition is as following:
F (X∗) = T,
F (Tran(X∗)) = T,
(1)
where X∗ is the adversarial example crafted by the attacker,
T is the target class specified, and Tran(∗) is the transfor-
mation suffered in the physical world. Previous methods do
not consider the robustness and thus adversarial examples
crafted by them may be largely destroyed and fail to attack
in the physical world.
In this paper, we propose a new crafting method to gener-
ate adversarial examples with both high imperceptibility and
high robustness, as detailed in the following sections.
The Proposed Method
In this section, we first present a new distance metric consid-
ering the effects of different pixels on human eyes, then we
propose to maximize the probability gap between the target
class and left classes for increasing the noise tolerance of
adversarial examples. As last, an efficient greedy algorithm
is introduced to enhance robustness and ensure impercepti-
bility in adversarial attacks.
Imperceptibility of Adversarial Example Attacks
According to contrast masking theory in image process-
ing (Legge and Foley 1980; Lin, Dong, and Xue 2005;
Liu et al. 2010), human eyes are more sensitive to pertur-
bations on pixels in low variance regions than those in high
variance regions. For example, in Figure 1, the left image is
the original sample. The middle and right images are per-
turbed with the same magnitude on 10 pixels but at different
positions. The positions of perturbations on the middle im-
age are all at high variance region (the disorder desk) while
the right image is perturbed at the low variance region (the
black bag on the floor). We can see that it is hardly to detect
the perturbations on the middle image, however, people with
normal visual capability can notice the perturbations on the
black bag on the floor.
Therefore, to make adversarial examples imperceptible,
we should perturb pixels at high variance zones rather than
low variance ones. In this paper, we compute the variance of
a pixel xi based on the standard deviation SD(xi) among
Figure 1: Perturbations added in different pixels raise vary-
ing human perceptual attentions. The red line box marks the
perturbation in each perturbed image.
an n× n region as shown in Equation 2, where Si is the set
consisting of pixels in the n×n region, µ is the average value
of pixels in the region. Specifically, for n = 3, the variance
is calculated as the standard deviation of the pixel and its 8
neighbors.
SD(xi) =
√√√√ ∑xk∈Si(xk − µ)2
n2
. (2)
Accordingly, we introduce perturbation sensitivity to
measure how much “attention” will be drawn by adding per
“unit” perturbation on a pixel. It is defined as follows:
Sen(xi) = 1/SD(xi). (3)
When the pixel has low variance, the perturbation sensitiv-
ity is high. Therefore, adding perturbations on this pixel is
easily detected by humans.
To evaluate the human perceptual effect of a perturbation
added to a pixel, we can multiply the magnitude of the per-
turbation by its sensitivity. When crafting an adversarial ex-
ample, we usually perturb more than one pixel. As a result,
we sum up all the effects of perturbations and use it as the
distance between the original example and the adversarial
one, as shown in the following equation:
D(X∗, X) =
N∑
i=1
δi ∗ Sen(xi), (4)
where D(X∗, X) denotes the distance between the adver-
sarial example X∗ and the original one X . δi is the pertur-
bation added to the pixel xi and N is the total number of
pixels. When generating adversarial examples, we can add
constraints on the distance so that the perturbations would
not be detected.
Robustness of Adversarial Example Attacks
Another limitation of existing methods for adversarial ex-
ample attack is that they have very low success rates in the
physical world due to deviation caused by regular trans-
formations of images such as compressing, resizing and
smoothing. The challenge of the problem is that transforma-
tions in the physical world are usually uncertain and hard to
model, and thus we cannot enhance robustness of attacks for
specific situations. In this paper, we give a general solution
for robust attacks by maximizing noise tolerance of adver-
sarial examples. The noise tolerance reflects the amount of
noises that adversarial examples can tolerate with the mis-
classified target label unchanged.
Classifiers based on neural networks output the probabili-
ties for all classes, and select the highest one as the result la-
bel for the given input. The probability for one class denotes
the confidence of classifying the input to this category. Pre-
vious adversarial example attacks only maximizes the prob-
ability of the target class, however, we find for robust attack,
it is necessary to reduce the max probability among other
classes as well. Naturally, we dedicate to maximize the gap
between the probability of the target class and the max prob-
ability of all other classes. It can be formulated as follows:
Gap(X∗) = Pt −max(Pi) (i 6= t), (5)
where Pt denotes the target class probability and Pi refers
to probabilities of other classes. Intuitively, the higher the
probability gap, the more robust adversarial example attacks.
Figure 2 is a simple example to illustrate this idea. In
this figure, you can see there are two adversarial examples
against the same original sample. They are all misclassified
as ship with 0.6 probability, but with different probability
gap. Adversarial example 1 has a higher probability gap than
adversarial example 2. Now, after suffering JPEG compres-
sion (quality is 60), adversarial example 1 still is classified
as ship with 0.5 probability. While adversarial example 2 is
classified as dog with 0.52 probability and the probability of
ship now decreases to 0.36. Only the first two classes with
the highest probability are listed in the Figure.
Ship=0.6, Dog=0.12 Dog=0.34Ship=0.6,
Adversarial 1 Adversarial 2
JPEG Compression(Quality=60) 
Ship=0.50,  Dog=0.28 Dog=0.52Ship=0.36,
Figure 2: Adversarial example with higher probability gap
is more robust when suffering a same image transformation.
Imperceptible and Robust Attacks
In this work, we target to achieve both imperceptible and
robust adversarial example attacks against neural networks.
In order to obtain imperceptibility, the distance D(X∗, X)
between the original example X and the adversarial one X∗
should be constrained. Then we can increase the robustness
of adversarial example attacks whenever possible under this
constraint. Overall, we formulate the problem as follows:
argmax
X∗
Gap(X∗)
s.t. D(X∗, X) ≤ Dmax
(6)
whereDmax is the largest distance allowed in order not to be
detected by human eyes. In practice, users need to determine
this value based on the input images.
This problem is difficult to solve as the objective function
(probability gap) is not differentiable including a max func-
tion (the max probability of left classes). Thus the traditional
gradient descent method is not applicable. Moreover, in each
iteration, it is time consuming to determine which pixels
to perturb and what magnitudes to add. To deal with these
problems, we first smooth the objective function to make it
differentiable and then propose an efficient greedy algorithm
to simplify computations in each iteration, as detailed in the
following subsections.
Smoothing the Objective Function We smooth the max
function to the differentiable one based on the following
equation:
max(x, y) ≈ log(ekx + eky)/k. (7)
It achieves the approximation by amplifying the differ-
ence between kx and ky using the exponential function.
When kx is quite bigger than ky, ekx will be much larger
than eky . Then ekx + eky will approximately equal to ekx
and log(ekx)/k is essentially equal to x. When x and y are
not significantly different, k is used to improve the accuracy
of approximation. Given an example with x = 0.2, y = 0.1,
if k = 1, then log(ekx + eky)/k ≈ 0.84. However, it ap-
proximates to 0.2000005 when k = 100. We can make the
approximation as close to the max function as we want by
setting large enough k.
Now the objective function is transformed in the follow-
ing format and can be differentiated for further optimization:
Gap(X∗) ≈ Pt − log(
∑
ekPi)/k i 6= t (8)
A Greedy Algorithm for Optimization After smoothing
the objective function, we can solve the problem using the
traditional gradient descent method. However, in each iter-
ation, we have to choose which pixels to modify and what
magnitudes to add. Even though we assume each pixel is
perturbed with the same magnitude, the time taken for solv-
ing the problem is still prohibitively long. For example, if
each image contains 100 pixels and we choose to perturb 10
pixels at each iteration, then we have to search
(
100
10
)
times
to find the best 10 pixels to modify.
Considering that we have to choose pixels with less per-
turbation sensitivity to human eyes and at the same time in-
crease the objective function in Equation 8, we define a new
quantity called perturbation priority to estimate the effect of
perturbing a pixel:
PerturbPriority(xi) =
5xiGap(X∗)
Sen(xi)
, (9)
where 5xiGap(X∗) is the gradient of the probability gap
for pixel xi. Perturbation priority indicates how much prob-
ability gap increased by adding one “unit” of perturbation to
the current pixel xi, and therefore it reflects the priority of
pixels to perturb in the adversarial example generating pro-
cess.
Algorithm 1: The proposed algorithm to generate ad-
versarial examples.
Input: The legitimate sample X , the max allowed
human perceptual distance Dmax, the number of
pixels perturbed in each iteration m and the
perturbation magnitude δ.
Output: Adversarial example X∗.
1 while D(X,X∗) < Dmax do
2 PerturbPriority← Calculate perturbation
priority for each pixel;
3 SortedPerturbPriority← Sort perturbation
priority in PerturbPriority;
4 SelectedP ixels← Choose m pixels with largest
perturbation priority;
5 X∗← Perturb selected pixels with magnitude δ;
6 D(X∗, X) =
∑N
i ∆i ∗ Sen(xi);
7 X = X∗.
8 end
Based on the perturbation priority, we propose a greedy
algorithm to efficiently achieve imperceptible and robust ad-
versarial example attacks. The detailed crafting process is
shown in Algorithm 1, in which it first calculates each pix-
els’ perturbation priority based on the gradients of the prob-
ability gap and perturbation sensitivity in line 2. Then we
sort pixels according to perturbation priority in line 3. Next,
we perturb the first m pixels with a small magnitude δ and
calculate the human perceptual distance of the updated ad-
versarial examples in line 4-6, where ∆i is the total pertur-
bations added to xi. At last, in line 7 the original exampleX
is updated. The whole process is repeated until the constraint
on D(X∗, X) is violated.
Experimental Evaluations
Dataset. All the experiments are performed on MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets. The MNIST dataset includes 70000
gray scale hand-written digit images with the size of 28*28.
The classification goal is to map the images to the corre-
sponding digits from 0 to 9. The CIFAR10 dataset contains
6000 color images. Each image has the size of 32*32*3.
There are 10 classes in the dataset, which are airplane, auto-
mobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship and truck. The
intensity values of pixels in all these images are scaled to a
real number in [0, 1].
DNN Model. For each dataset, we trained a model. The
architectures of these two models are detailed in Table 1.
They are all 8 layers DNN with ReLU as the activation func-
tion. The MNIST and CIFAR10 model achieve 99.18% and
84.21% classification rate respectively.
0-1 1-2 4-5
Airplane
-dog
Deer-
truck
Cat-
horse
Dog-
ship3-1
Original 
samples
Our Method 
L-BFGS
FGSM
JSMA
Figure 3: Adversarial examples generated by different crafting methods in MNIST and CIFAR10. Adversarial examples in the
second row crafted by our method are much more imperceptible than others from the following rows. While JSMA method in
the last row performs the worst.
Table 1: Model architectures.
Layer MNIST CIFAR
Input layer 28, 28 32, 32, 3
Convolution layer 1 3, 3, 32 3, 3, 64
Convolution layer 2 3, 3, 32 3, 3, 64
Max pooling layer 1 2, 2 2, 2
Convolution layer 3 3, 3, 64 3, 3, 128
Convolution layer 4 3, 3, 64 3, 3, 128
Max pooling layer 2 2, 2 2, 2
Fully connected layer 1 128 512
Fully connected layer 2 10 10
Softmax
Baselines. The baselines used in these experiments are
three widely-used adversarial example attacks, Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) (Papernot et al.
2016), iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) and box-constrained L-
BFGS method (Szegedy et al. 2013). For detailed experi-
mental setups of these methods please refer to the original
papers. In our method, we select 20 pixels to add perturba-
tions with a magnitude of 0.01 in each iteration.
Evaluate Imperceptibility
In this experiment, we evaluate the imperceptibility of ad-
versarial examples crafted by our method and the baseline
methods. We perform adversarial example attacks against
the testing set (10000 test images) in MNIST and CIFAR10
respectively. These adversarial examples are just success-
fully misclassified to the target classes which were randomly
assigned. That is to say, we stop adding perturbations once
the target class attack is successful. Then for each attack
method, we get two groups of adversarial examples for the
two datasets.
Evaluate with Human Perception: We present several
groups of images in Figure 3. Each group images include an
original sample and its corresponding adversarial examples
crafted by different attack methods. The left four columns
are from MNIST and the right four columns are from CI-
FAR10. Images in the first row are original samples in the
testing set. The second row are adversarial examples crafted
by our method. The following rows are adversarial examples
from L-BFGS, FGSM and JSMA attack methods, respec-
tively. The target adversarial classes are listed at the bottom.
From Figure 3, we can see that adversarial examples
crafted by our method in the second row are the most im-
perceptible, which nearly look the same as the original one.
While JSMA method in the last row performs the worst and
the perturbed pixels are easily detected by human eyes. The
reason is that JSMA method perturbs pixels to the maxi-
mum value without considering pixels’ human perceptual
sensitivity. As a result, the perturbed pixels may be in the
high sensitive region and thus raise human attentions. For L-
BFGS and FGSM methods, they perform better than JSMA.
This is because these two methods use L2 norm and L∞
norm which tend to perturb more pixels with smaller pertur-
bations. Although the pixels perturbed may be in the sensi-
tive region, they raise relatively low attentions with smaller
perturbations. These experimental results show that consid-
ering human perceptual system, our method can generate
much more imperceptible adversarial examples comparing
with baseline methods.
Evaluate Distance Metric: To evaluate the effective-
ness of our human perceptual distance metric, we calculate
the distances between the adversarial examples and original
samples. The results are listed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Human perceptual distances of adversarial exam-
pels crafted by varying adversarial methods in MNIST and
CIFAR10. Adversarial examples crafted by our method has
the smallest human perceptual distances.
We can see that the distances of adversarial examples
crafted by our method are the smallest (44.78 for MNIST
and 51.98 for CIFAR10), while the distances of JSMA
method are the largest (80.34 for MNIST and 92.25 for CI-
FAR10). This coincides with the results in the previous hu-
man perception experiments. Therefore, we can believe the
distance metric proposed in this work can appropriately re-
flect the similarity between original samples and adversarial
examples.
Discussions: From the above results, we know that hu-
man perceptual distances in MNIST are larger than those
in CIFAR10, so adversarial example attacks against MNIST
dataset are more difficult than CIFAR10 dataset. We an-
alyze the reasons from two aspects. One is that the im-
ages in MNIST have a large uniform background, while for
CIFAR10, the backgrounds of natural images only occupy
small regions. As a result, in MNIST images, pixels have a
higher human perceptual sensitivity than those in CIFAR10.
The other reason is that the classification rate in MNIST
dataset is about 15% higher than CIFAR10. So the model
trained in MNIST has higher confidence with the classifying
results, thus it is more difficult to attack the model trained
with MNIST dataset.
Evaluate Robustness
In this experiment, we evaluate the robustness of adversarial
examples crafted with our method and the baseline methods.
We compare all the attack methods under the same max hu-
man perceptual distance, Dmax = 70. This is determined
empirically that the distance less than 70 would not raise
much human attention. In this part we only present the re-
sults for dataset CIFAR10, because the results for MNIST
are quite similar.
Robustness Definition: The robustness can be described
as the fraction of adversarial examples which are still mis-
classified as the target class after the natural transformations.
It is also called the success attack rate in the physical world.
The definition is as follows:
R =
m∑
i=1
C(Xi, labeli)C(X
∗
i , Ti)C(Tran(X
∗
i ), Ti)
m∑
i=1
C(Xi, labeli)C(X
∗
i , Ti)
(10)
where m is the number of testing samples used to compute
the robustness. Xi is a test image and labeli is the true la-
bel of this image, and X∗i is the adversarial example. Ti is
the target class for Xi sample assigned by the attacker. The
function Tran(∗) is an image transformation operation in
the physical world. We study several transformations in this
experiment, including adding gaussian noises, JPEG com-
pressing, image blurring, changing contrast and brightness.
The function C(X, label) is used to check whether the im-
age was classified correctly or not:
C(X, label) =
{
1, If image X is classified as label;
0, otherwise.
Evaluate Robustness with Gaussian Noises and Trans-
formations: We test the physical success rate using four im-
age transformations: JPEG compressing, gaussian blurring,
contrast and brightness adjusting. The experimental results
are showed in Figure 5. We also test the robustness with
gaussian noises which have five intensities with standard de-
viation changed from 0.05 to 0.25 with a step of 0.05 (The
gaussian mean is 0). The experimental results are listed in
Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of robustness for various adversarial
methods adding gaussian noises.
Noises Our JSMA L-BFGS FGSM
Std=0.05 98.5% 98.25% 86.8% 82.5%
Std=0.1 94.0% 88.5% 82.0% 79.5%
Std=0.15 77.8% 68.8% 62.6% 64%
Std=0.2 68.5% 55.12% 50.8% 42.5%
Std=0.25 62% 33.2% 28.6% 21.5%
It is clearly shown that our method performs the best
among all the four transformations.For example, in JPEG
compressing, our method performs 76% success attack rate
while for FGSM method, the success rate is just 52.3%.
Experimental results in adding gaussian noises show that
our method also achieves higher robustness than other ones.
Moreover, the benefit is more obvious with stronger noises.
For example, in the fifth intensity with standard deviation
(0.25), our method achieves 62% success rate while the av-
erage success rate of the baseline methods is just about 26%.
Apart from these observations, there are other observa-
tions drawn based on the results. Firstly, we can see that
Figure 5: Comparison of robustness for various adversarial methods for image transformations.
JSMA method performs the second best in these experi-
ments though it achieves the worst results in previous hu-
man perception experiments. It can be explained that JSMA
method perturbs less pixels with larger perturbations, and
these large perturbations can tolerant more noises added on
them. While for the FGSM method, it has the worst robust-
ness in these experiments, because it tends to make small
perturbations on the whole image. The effects of these small
perturbations on pixels are more easily changed with noises.
Our method, however, tries to maximize the noise tolerance
and at the same time consider imperceptibility, therefore, it
achieves great results for both imperceptibility and robust-
ness.
Conclusions
Adversarial example attacks against neural networks have
become one of the most severe security problems in artifi-
cial intelligence. Traditional adversarial example attacks do
not consider human perceptual systems and thus are eas-
ily detected. Moreover, the success attack rate drops largely
due to inevitable noises in the physical world. In this pa-
per, we introduce a new adversarial example attack, which
can achieve both high imperceptibility and robustness in the
physical world. Specifically, we propose a new distance met-
ric considering human perceptual systems. The metric eval-
uates the sensitivity of image pixel to human eyes, and thus it
can guide us to add perturbations with less chances of being
detected. To improve the successful attack rate in practice,
we try to maximize the probability gap between the adver-
sarial target class and other classes. A simple yet effective
greedy algorithm is introduced to achieve the optimization
goal under the constraint of not being detected. Experimen-
tal results show that adversarial examples achieved by our
method is more imperceptible and robust than those pro-
duced by previous methods.
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